We present a revealed preference analysis of the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. Our speci c focus is on a two-player game involving consumption decisions. We consider a setting in which the empirical analyst has information on both the threat points bundles and the bargaining outcomes. We rst establish a revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. is characterization implies conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for consistency of observed consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model. However, these conditions turn out to be nonlinear in unknowns and therefore difficult to verify. Given this, we subsequently present necessary conditions and sufficient conditions that are linear (and thus easily testable). We illustrate the practical usefulness of these conditions by means of an application to experimental data. Such an experimental setting implies a most powerful analysis of the empirical goodness of the Nash bargaining model for describing consumption decisions. To our knowledge, this provides a rst empirical test of the Nash bargaining model on consumption data. Finally, we present some extensions that can be used in non-experimental (e.g. household consumption) settings, which oen do not contain information on individual consumption bundles in threat points. In these settings, we also have that the bargaining weights need not be symmetric. erefore, we present the testable implications of the generalized Nash bargaining solution and we also we consider the possibility that threat point bundles are not observed.
Introduction
Bargaining models describe decision processes that simultaneously involve multiple players. ey de ne the outcome of such a process by using information on a bargaining set, which includes all attainable utility levels for every player, and a set of threat (or disagreement) points. In the literature, the Nash * We are grateful to the Editor Steve Pischke and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, which substantially improved the paper. † bargaining model is by far the most popular one. 1 For example, it has been used for describing household decision making, rm-union wage negotiations, job-matching and job-search models, international trade and oligopolistic competition. e Nash bargaining solution is then mainly used for its theoretical convenience: studies usually assume the model without empirical motivation. Somewhat surprisingly given its widespread use, relatively few studies have actually focused on the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution.
In this paper, we concentrate on the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model for a twoplayer game involving consumption decisions on bundles of goods. e distinguishing feature of our study is that we build on the revealed preference characterization of the model. As we will discuss below, this revealed preference approach has some particularly attractive features for empirically testing a speci c behavioral model. We demonstrate the practical usefulness of the approach by an application to experimental data. We conduct a specially tailored experiment that implies a most powerful analysis of the Nash bargaining model as a tool for describing decisions on consumption bundles. To our knowledge, this provides a rst empirical test of this model in a consumption setting. Next, we also discuss the applicability of our revealed preference approach to observational (or non-experimental) data, which can be useful for household consumption analysis on the basis of the Nash bargaining model.
Testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution.
Starting with Manser and Brown (1980) 's seminal contribution, a few studies have focused on the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution for consumption decisions. 2 A common feature of these studies is that they follow a differential approach, which concentrates on properties of functions representing the primitives of the decision process (e.g. individual preferences). 3 Empirical applications of this approach then usually require some (non-veri able) a priori speci cation of these functions. And, thus, testing consistency of observed behavior with the Nash bargaining model is always conditional upon this speci cation. is will imply a basic difference with our further analysis, which follows a revealed preference approach rather than a differential one.
Another main difference pertains to the fact that existing studies typically do not present a characterization of the Nash bargaining model. Rather, they focus on explaining deviations between behavior consistent with the Nash bargaining model and behavior consistent with maximizing a single utility function (which follows the so-called 'unitary' consumption model, with the well known Slutsky conditions as a differential characterization). In this respect, one notable exception is the study of Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2012) . ese authors do provide a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. But, again, their analysis differs from ours in that it follows a differential approach. In addition, Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer focus on a different setting than we do: contrary to most of the above mentioned studies, they consider testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution for the problem of sharing a pie (e.g. budget sharing) rather than for consumption decisions involving bundles of goods. An important implication of our focus on consumption decisions (rather than pie sharing) is that not only income levels but also (relative) good prices become important; 4 see our discussion in Section 3.2, where we emphasize the importance of price changes (in addition to income changes) when verifying consistency of consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model.
When it comes to testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution, threat points always play a crucial role. 5 ese threat points are the outcomes of individual players in the case no agreement is reached, and are also referred to as disagreement points. In this study, we carry out a speci c experiment that naturally allows for obtaining information on threat point consumption bundles. As we will indicate in Section 4, this entails a very powerful analysis of the empirical goodness of the Nash bargaining model. Importantly, in Section 5 we also discuss the possible extension of our basic framework to situations in which the threat point bundles are not observed. is will obtain testable conditions for the Nash bargaining model that can be used in non-experimental (e.g. household consumption) settings, which oen do not contain information on individual consumption bundles in threat points. 6 Revealed preferences. We adopt a revealed preference approach in the tradition of Samuelson (1938) , Houthakker (1950) , Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) . In contrast to the differential approach, this approach does not require any functional speci cation prior to the analysis. It obtains testable conditions that can be veri ed by (only) using a nite set of consumption observations (i.e. prices and quantities). More precisely, for a particular behavioral model (such as the Nash bargaining model), revealed preference methods basically check whether we can construct primitives (e.g. utility function(s) capturing individual preference(s)) that make the observed data consistent with the model. If such primitives can be de ned, then we conclude that we cannot reject the hypothesis that observed behavior is indeed rationalizable in terms of the model subject to evaluation.
e revealed preference approach avoids that a speci c behavioral model is rejected because of an erroneous speci cation (while the actual consumption behavior is consistent with the model). Essentially, our revealed preference conditions are the weakest (necessary and sufficient) conditions which consumption observations must satisfy to be rationalizable as Nash bargained outcomes. e conditions are not confounded by nonveri able auxiliary assumptions (e.g. regarding the nature of the individual preferences). From this perspective, they enable a pure test of the theoretical Nash bargaining model for describing observed consumption behavior.
Another advantage of the revealed preference approach is that it can be meaningfully applied to small data sets. For our setting, this means that we can fruitfully use our revealed preference conditions for testing the Nash bargaining model even with only a few consumption observations. As such, we avoid (oen debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across individual players. Speci cally, in Section 4 we will show that our revealed preference tests have satisfactory discriminatory power for (only) 9 consumption observations per dyad (i.e. a two-player group).
Our study also complements a recent strand of literature that focuses on a revealed preference analysis of decision processes with multiple players. More speci cally, Vermeulen (2007, 2011a ) derived a revealed preference characterization of the collective model, which assumes a Pareto optimal solution, and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2011b) provided a revealed preference characterization of noncooperative behavior, which assumes a noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
In fact, an important focus in our following analysis will be on comparing the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model with the ones of the collective model. Indeed, we believe that the collective model provides a natural comparison partner for the Nash bargaining model, because it imposes less prior structure. 7 Our analysis shows that this structural difference effectively translates into different empirical restrictions.
Two preliminary remarks are in order with respect to our following revealed preference analysis. First, the revealed preference tests on which we focus are not traditional statistical tests, which are characterized by standard errors and so allow for statistical inference. Our tests are 'sharp' ones: they check whether or not the data pass the revealed preference conditions exactly. If the data do not pass the conditions, then the model under study is rejected. 8 As a result, we will not use the usual statistical methods for evaluating the empirical validity of consumption models. By contrast, we will follow a recent proposal of Beatty and Crawford (2011) that evaluates behavioral models on the basis of a so-called 'predictive success' measure, which is specially tailored for the type of revealed preference tests that we consider here. As we will explain in Section 4, this measure of predictive success simultaneously accounts for the pass rate (measured as number of dyads that pass the Nash bargaining conditions) and the discriminatory power (measured as rejection probability for the given data) of a particular model speci cation. In our concluding Section 6 we will brie y discuss the possible extension of our revealed preference framework to enable (more standard) statistical testing. As we will argue, such statistical tests may be particularly relevant in the context of observational (i.e. non-experimental) data.
e second remark pertains to our speci c focus on the characterization of the Nash bargaining model, and testing consistency of observed behavior with the model. If observed behavior is consistent with a particular model, then a natural next question pertains to recovering/identifying the primitives of the underlying decision model (e.g. individual preferences). For compactness, we will not consider such recovery here. However, it is worth emphasizing that our revealed preference characterization does allow for subsequent recovery analysis. For example, Varian (1982) and, more recently, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008) and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2011a) studied such recovery (based on revealed preferences) for closely related consumption models. e analysis of these authors can be extended to the current setting when starting from the revealed preference characterization established below.
Experimental analysis. We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our revealed preference characterization by means of an application to experimental data. is obtains a most pure test of the Nash bargaining model. Indeed, our laboratory experiment effectively avoids controversial preference homogeneity assumptions (excluding changing preferences) and data measurement problems that are usually associated with observational data. In this respect, it has been argued before that revealed preference testing tools are especially useful within an experimental context; see, for example, Sippel (1997) , Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) , Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Bruyneel, Cherchye, and De Rock (2012) . 9 Moreover, the controlled environment of the lab allows us to obtain data on threat point consumption bundles as well as on the bargaining outcomes. As such, this provides an ideal setting to verify 7 Speci cally, the collective model only assumes Pareto efficiency, whereas the Nash bargaining model additionally assumes symmetry, invariance with respect to affine transformations of the utility functions, and contraction independence. See also our discussion in Section 3.
8 Varian (1990) provides a detailed discussion on the difference between revealed preference tests and traditional statistical tests.
9 See also Cox (1997) for an extensive discussion on the use of revealed preference methodology in combination with experimental data. In particular, this author indicates the implicit assumption that decisions in the experiment are separable from other decisions of the same decision makers. Given our experimental design (see Section 4), we believe that we can reasonably assume that this condition of separability is met (at least by approximation).
consistency of dyad consumption behavior with the Nash equilibrium solution.
At this point it is interesting to compare our analysis with other experimental studies of the Nash bargaining model. See in particular Siegel and Fouraker (1960) and Roth and Malouf (1979) for early examples, and Kagel and Roth (1995) for a more recent review of the literature. Here, we note two important differences between our experiment and earlier experiments. First, we adopt a substantially different focus. In particular we concentrate on the Nash bargaining model for describing consumption decisions involving multiple goods. By contrast, other experiments typically focused on 'pie sharing' problems that relate to distributing a single good (e.g. budget) over different players. As such, our experimental analysis is the rst one that actually tests the validity of the Nash bargaining solution for decisions on consumption bundles. As indicated above, a notable implication of our focus on consumption decisions is that not only income changes but also price changes become important when checking Nash bargaining rationalizability. is difference in substance also makes that we cannot directly compare the results of our experiment with those of earlier experiments. Another main difference between our study and the earlier experimental studies relates to the methodology that we use. Our revealed preference tests basically verify the weakest (necessary and sufficient) implications for observed consumption behavior to be consistent with the theoretical implications of Nash bargaining. 10 ey apply the theory directly to the choice data and are free of nonveri able auxiliary assumptions (e.g. regarding the structure of individual preferences). 11
Paper outline. Let us summarize our main points developed further on. In Section 2, we set the stage by introducing the revealed preference approach on which we focus here. Speci cally, we brie y recapture the revealed preference characterizations of individual rationality (i.e. individual utility maximization) and collective rationality (i.e. rational dyad behavior in terms of the collective model). is will be instrumental for our discussion in the following sections.
In Section 3 we derive the revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining model for the case with observed threat point bundles. As we will show, verifying consistency of observed consumption behavior with this characterization requires solving a set of inequalities that are nonlinear in unknowns. Such nonlinear conditions are difficult to use in empirical applications. erefore, we establish (separate) necessary and sufficient conditions that are linear in the unknowns and thus allow for an easy empirical veri cation.
In Section 4 we describe our experimental design and we discuss our tests results. More speci cally we report on the pass rates as well as on the discriminatory power of our conditions.
In Section 5, we focus on situations that involve asymmetric bargaining weights (i.e. generalized Nash bargaining) and settings in which threat point bundles are not observed. Our main argument here will be that the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution may have stronger testable implications than the collective consumption model even in such situations. As also indicated above, these ndings may be relevant for applications to observational (e.g. household) data.
In Section 6 we will summarize our main ndings. In addition, we will set out some interesting avenues for follow-up research. 10 Recently, Carvajal and Gonzales (2011) and Chambers and Echenique (2011) presented formally related revealed preference conditions for Nash bargaining rationalizability that speci cally pertain to 'pie sharing' problems (as opposed to consumption problems involving multiple goods, which we consider here). Experimental studies using these conditions may be more directly comparable to the experimental studies of Nash bargaining that we mentioned above.
11 For example, two most frequently cited tests of the Nash bargaining model are reported by Siegel and Fouraker (1960) and Roth and Malouf (1979) . Siegel and Fouraker work with linear utility functions and the results of Roth and Malouf rely on the assumption that individuals are expected utility maximizers. By its very nature, our revealed preference analysis does not require such additional preference assumptions and it thus implies a pure assessment of the empirical applicability of the Nash bargaining model (for modeling consumption decisions).
Revealed preference characterization of individual and collective rationality
is section introduces notation and some basic concepts and results that will be useful for our following discussion. We rst de ne individual rationality and present the corresponding revealed preference characterization and, subsequently, we do the same for collective rationality.
Individual rationality
roughout, we will consider consumption decisions on bundles with |N| goods. Our analysis starts from a nite set of |T| decision situations, with T = {1, ..., |T|}. Each situation t ∈ T is characterized by prices p t ∈ R |N| ++ and income Y t . In the sequel, we will assume utility functions that are continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in their arguments. As for now, suppose the individual is endowed with a utility function U. is individual is rational if, for each t, (s)he selects a bundle q t ∈ R |N| + that solves the following problem (OP-IR):
Consider a data set S = {p t , q t } t∈T . We obtain the following condition for individual rationality. (ii) For all t ∈ T, there exist numbers U t ∈ R + and λ t ∈ R ++ such that, for all t, v ∈ T,
In this result, the equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) means that there exists a rationalizing utility function U if and only if the set S satis es a number of inequalities de ned in the unknowns U t and λ t . ese inequalities are commonly referred to as Afriat inequalities. Intuitively, these Afriat inequalities allow for an explicit construction of the utility levels (U t ) and the marginal utilities of income (λ t ) associated with each observation t. We remark that these inequalities are linear in unknowns. us, we can use standard linear programming techniques to verify if S is individually rationalizable.
In view of our following exposition, it is interesting to remark that the Afriat inequalities bear a direct interpretation in terms of concavity of the utility function U in combination with the rst order conditions for problem OP-IR (see also Diewert (2012) for a more thorough discussion of this interpretation). To see this, let us assume that the utility function U is differentiable. en, from concavity of U, it must be that, for all q t and q v ,
where ∇ q U(q v ) is the gradient of U(q v ). From the rst order conditions for individually rational behavior, we obtain
where λ v is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Substituting (2) in (1) and replacing U(q v ) and U(q t ) with U v and U t effectively gives the Afriat inequalities of eorem 1.
Collective rationality
Consider a dyad (or two-player group) consisting of A and B, with utility functions U A and U B . Like before, in each decision situation t the dyad spends an income Y t on a set of |N| goods. We will assume that all goods are privately consumed and that each individual only cares for her/his own consumption. 12 Collective rationality means consistency with the collective consumption model, which assumes a Pareto optimal solution of the multi-player (in casu two-player) game. Based on the second welfare theorem, Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 has shown that a collectively rational consumption decision can be represented as if it were the outcome of a two-step procedure. 
We get the following condition for collective rationality. 
De nition 2. Let S = {p
Just like for individual rationality, collective rationality requires nding a solution for Afriat inequalities, which are linear in unknowns. In this case, we obtain a set of inequalities for both A and B. As before, these inequalities allow for an explicit construction of (in casu player-speci c) utilities (U A t and 12 For simplicity, we will abstract from modeling public goods or consumption externalities and we will focus on two-player groups. However, our following analysis can readily be extended to groups with more than two players. It is also fairly easy to extend the theoretical models and the corresponding revealed preference characterizations presented in this and the following sections to account for public goods and externalities. For example, see Vermeulen (2007, 2011a) for dealing with public goods and externalities in revealed preference analysis of the collective consumption model.
U B
t ) and marginal utilities of income (λ A t and λ B t ). e interpretation in terms of concavity of the utility functions in combination with the rst order conditions for rational behavior is directly similar to the one that applies to individual rationality. It will be interesting to compare this characterization with the revealed preference characterization that applies to the Nash bargaining model. As indicated in the Introduction, the Nash bargaining model differs from the collective model by assuming more than just Pareto efficiency for the within-dyad decision process.
Nash bargaining model
is section rst de nes the Nash bargaining solution and introduces the corresponding revealed preference characterization. To enhance intuition, we also provide a numerical example that illustrates the role of the different conditions in this characterization. As we will discuss, some of these conditions are nonlinear in unknown variables, which makes them difficult to use in practical applications. Given this, we subsequently present necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for consistency with the Nash bargaining model that are linear in unknowns. In Section 4, we will use these conditions in our application for empirical veri cation of the Nash bargaining model.
Revealed preference characterization
We again consider a setting with two players (A 
Next, if the players come to an agreement, then the dyad allocation coincides with the Nash bargaining solution. For the given income Y t and prices p t , this solution maximizes the product of the individuals' excess utility (i.e. utility under agreement minus utility under disagreement). As shown by Nash (1950) , this is the unique bargaining outcome that satis es the axioms of Pareto optimality, symmetry, invariance with respect to affine transformations of the utility functions, and contraction independence. We remark that these four axioms usually lead to a unique outcome of the decision process. is implies an important difference with the collective consumption model. is last model only assumes Pareto efficiency, which generally characterizes a continuum of possible outcomes.
Formally, the Nash bargaining solution de nes individual consumption bundles (
that solve the next problem (OP-NB):
To obtain our testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution, let us assume that we have a data
Similar to eorems 1 and 2, the inequalities (NB-i)-(NB-iv) are Afriat inequalities. Like before, these inequalities allow us to construct (player-speci c) utilities and marginal utilities of income (in casu for both the bargaining outcomes and the threat points). Moreover, it follows from eorem 2 that the inequalities (NB-i)-(NB-ii) guarantee that the bargaining outcome is Pareto efficient. Basically, referring to our discussion in Section 2, the constraints (NB-iii) and (NB-iv) impose individual rationality when choosing the threat point bundles x A t and x B t (see OP-TP), while the constraints (NB-i) and (NB-ii) imply collective rationality (or Pareto efficiency) of the bargaining outcome de ning the bundles q A t and q B t (see OP-NB).
e nal constraints (NB-v) and (NB-vi) are then speci c to the Nash bargaining model under study. e constraints (NB-v) correspond to the last two constraints of OP-NB. Next, constraint (NB-vi) captures the very nature of the Nash bargaining model. Essentially, it states that each bargaining outcome must maximize the product of the individuals' excess utility; see the objective function of OP-NB. is constraint (NB-vi) is the crucial one for obtaining testable implications that are particular to the Nash bargaining solution. More speci cally, as indicated above, the constraints (NB-i)-(NB-v) imply the existence of utility functions V A , V B , U A and U B as well as Pareto efficiency. us, constraint (NB-vi) guarantees consistency with the remaining axioms underlying the Nash bargaining solution.
Condition (NB-vi) also has a clear interpretation in terms of the rst order conditions of the optimization problem OP-NB. If the functions U A and U B are differentiable, these rst order conditions require
with λ v again the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. en, setting
and λ
eorem 3 de nes necessary and sufficient conditions for observed consumption behavior to be consistent with the Nash bargained solution. Unfortunately, the constraint (NB-vi) is nonlinear in the unknowns (
. is makes it difficult to verify this constraint in practical applications. In Section 3.3, we will introduce necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for consistency with the characterization in eorem 3. ese conditions will be linear in unknowns and, thus, do allow for easy empirical veri cation.
Two nal remarks are in order with respect to our use of the data set
First, it implicitly assumes that individuals always reach an agreement, since we observe the corresponding bargaining outcomes. We could relax this constraint by introducing additional notation. However, this would only complicate our exposition without really adding new insights. Second, for each decision situation t we need to observe not only the consumption bundles in the bargaining outcomes (q A t and q B t ) but also the threat point bundles (x A t and x B t ). Obviously, this may seem to be a stringent data requirement. Still, as we will show in Section 4, such threat point information can fairly easily be obtained in an experimental setting. Next, in Section 5 we will provide testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution that imply weaker data requirements and, therefore, can be useful in (non-experimental) settings where exact information about the threat point bundles is lacking.
Illustrative example
Example 1 provides a numerical illustration of the conditions given in eorem 3. It considers a setting with 2 goods and 2 decision situations. is demonstrates that the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model can be applied in a meaningful way even if we have data on only a small number of decision situations. e example also shows the mechanics and the speci c role played by the different types of revealed preference constraints in eorem 3 (i.e. the 'collective rationality' restrictions (NB-i) and (NB-ii), the 'individual rationality' restrictions (NB-iii) and (NB-iv), and the 'Nash bargaining' restrictions (NB-v) and (NB-vi)).
In addition, Example 1 shows an important insight that is speci c to the consumption setting under consideration. It obtains that Nash bargaining rationalizability does not imply a positive-monotonic association between threat point income shares and Nash bargained income shares. In particular, for individual A the threat point income rises from 13 (in decision situation 1) to 18 (in situation 2), while for individual B it decreases from 23 (situation 1) to 18 (situation 2). By contrast, in the bargaining outcome, the individual income share decreases for A (from 23 to 20) while it increases for B (from 20 to 23).
is may seem paradoxical at rst, as one might have expected that a higher threat point income yields a better bargaining position, which in turn leads to a higher income share in the eventual bargaining outcome. e explanation of this paradox relates to our particular focus on consumption decisions. Speci cally, different decision situations typically involve not only other distributions of the threat point incomes but also changed (relative) prices for the consumption goods. And it is these price changes that can effectively make consumption behavior Nash bargaining rationalizable even when the bargained income share of some individual(s) decreases as compared to the threat point situation. To take a speci c example, when going from decision situation 1 to situation 2, good 1 has become cheaper while good 2 has become more expensive. Given individual A's preference for good 1 over good 2 in the bargaining situation, (s)he can effectively realize a utility gain despite the decrease of her/his income share.
Here, it is worth to indicate that a positive-monotonic association between individual threat point incomes and Nash bargained incomes does hold as a necessary implication of the Nash bargaining model in the speci c case of pie sharing. As we discussed in the Introduction, such a pie sharing setting differs from our setting in that it does not involve decisions on how to allocate income to consumption goods, and so (relative) price changes do not matter by construction. e result is that only income changes can impact on the distribution pattern, which intuitively explains that individual threat point incomes must bear a positive-monotonic relation to individual bargained incomes. We remark, however, that in the case of pie sharing positive-monotonicity also applies as a minimal implication to alternative bargaining models (different from the Nash bargaining model). As such, it cannot provide a unique identi cation of the Nash bargaining model even if price changes are excluded. See, for example, Chambers and Echenique (2011) and Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2012) for a detailed discussion.
In our application in Section 4 we will show that the possibly negative association between threat point incomes and Nash bargained incomes is not just a theoretical curiosity. In our experiment we effectively do observe dyads of which the behavior is Nash bargaining rationalizable while threat point income shares and bargained income shares move in opposite directions. Actually, we also nd dyads of which the consumption behavior is not Nash bargaining rationalizable, even though threat point incomes and bargained incomes do move in the same direction. is leads to our more general conclusion that, in a consumption setting such as ours, the presence or absence of a positive-monotonic association between threat point and bargained incomes does not allow us to draw any conclusion on whether or not the consumption behavior is Nash bargaining rationalizable. 
Example 1. We consider a setting with 2 goods (|N| = 2) and 2 decision situations (|T| = 2). is de nes the set S
We can show that this set S is Nash bargaining rationalizable. Speci cally, the conditions in statement
(ii) of eorem 3 are met for
To establish Nash bargaining rationalizability, we rst verify the inequalities (NB-i) and (NB-ii), which require collective rationality (or Pareto efficiency) of the bargaining outcomes q A t and q B t :
Next, we have that the constraints (NB-iii) and (NB-iv) are satis ed, so guaranteeing individual rationality of the threat point bundles x A t and x B t :
Finally, we still need to check the speci c Nash bargaining restrictions. Our values for U A t , U B t , V A t and V B t meet the constraint (NB-v). Next, we have that also constraint (NB-vi) is met, i.e. : λ
, and
Empirical veri cation
e characterization in eorem 3 implies conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for consistency of observed consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model. However, because the constraint (NB-vi) turns out to be nonlinear in unknowns, these conditions are difficult to apply. In what follows, we will present necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for Nash bargaining rationality that are linear and, thus, easily testable. As we will indicate, these necessary and sufficient conditions do not coincide, which means that a particular data set may pass the necessary conditions but not the sufficient conditions. However, in Section 4 we will show that the conditions do obtain a conclusive answer for most data sets in our application. In our opinion, this suggests that these conditions constitute a useful starting point for empirically assessing Nash bargaining rationality. In general, we may expect their empirical implications to be fairly close to each other.
To obtain the conditions, we start from an equivalent reformulation of the constraint (NB-vi) in eorem 3. Speci cally, consider α t ∈]0, 1[ such that 
Sufficient conditions. Evidently, the constraints (NB-vi-a) remain nonlinear in the unknowns (
t and α t ). However, they do suggest a natural sufficient condition for Nash bargaining rationality. Essentially, this sufficient condition implies a grid search on a nite set A that contains a series of possible values for the variable α t in the above constraints. Consider a nite set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a K } containing K numbers from the unit interval ]0, 1[. en, we get the next result.
e set S is Nash bargaining rationalizable if, for all t ∈ T, there exist numbers U
us, for a given set A, this result provides sufficient conditions for Nash bargaining rationality, which replace the nonlinear constraint (NB-vi) in eorem 3 by the constraints (NB-vi-b) and (NB-vi-c). For a given speci cation of {α 1 , . . . , α |T| } the constraints (NB-vi-b) and (NB-vi-c) are linear in the un-
. e practical implementation of these sufficient conditions requires checking these linear constraints (together with (NB-i)-(NB-v)) for each possible speci cation of {α 1 , . . . , α |T| }. In our empirical application in Section 4 we use K = 9 and A = {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}.
Necessary conditions. Our necessary conditions again start from a nite set A as de ned above. Still, unlike the sufficient conditions in eorem 4, which focus on speci c values α t ∈ A for each t, the necessary conditions consider all a k ∈ A. At the outset, it is worth indicating that these necessary conditions will be rather technical ones, which have a less obvious intuition in terms of Nash bargaining rationality than our characterization in eorem 3. However, our empirical application in Section 4 will show that they do have substantial practical usefulness. Actually, as also mentioned before, a main result will be that the empirical implications of these necessary conditions are situated fairly closely to those of the sufficient conditions in eorem 4. e starting point of our necessary conditions is that, given (NB-vi-a), for each a k ∈ A and t ∈ T, we must have
e equality constraints in these expressions are nonlinear in the unknowns (
.erefore, our necessary conditions distinguish between the following two cases for each a k ∈ A and t ∈ T:
Now consider a binary variable R(k, t) ∈ {0, 1}. Let R(k, t) = 0 correspond to scenario (NB-vi-d) and R(k, t) = 1 to scenario (NB-vi-e). en, we can show that the constraints (NB-vi-a) are met only if 
e constraints (NB-vi-d1)-(NB-vi-e2) have been explained before. e additional constraints (NB-vi-f1) and (NB-vi-f2) imply a normalization that is required for the necessary conditions to have bite (i.e. to be rejectable); see the proof of eorem 5 for a more detailed discussion. As we require the test to be independent of the identity of s, we verify this set of inequalities for each possible s ∈ T. In the end, our necessary conditions imply constraints that are linear in unknowns, with some binary integer variables (i.e. the variables R(k, t)). ese conditions are easily tested by mixed integer programming solvers. In general, the ner the grid that de nes the set A (i.e. the larger K), the more stringent this necessary test will be.
Experimental design
We conducted our experiment at the University of Leuven (a Belgian University). Participants of our experiment were rst year business economics students (116 in total, 39 females). e experiment consisted of three sessions, which each contained around 40 participants. In every session, participants were divided over two computer rooms with 20 PCs each. Every participant was seated in front of a computer. Decision problems were presented on the computer. Before the actual experiment, each participant had to ll in a short questionnaire. e most important question was to choose one of three kinds of beverage items (a soda, a diet version of the same soda and orange juice) and one of three kinds of food items (potato chips, chocolate and grapes). All items were shown in front of the class room. We asked the participants to pick their preferred beverage and food items. is should avoid that, during the experiment, participants had to choose between one or more items they actually did not like: participants had to make allocation decisions that involved (only) the selected beverage and food items (i.e. |N| = 2).
e actual experiment began aer lling out the questionnaire. It consisted of two parts. In a rst part, each participant had to make 9 (= |T|) individual consumption decisions, which de ned the threat point bundles x A t and x B t . 14 ere was no time limit; participants could use all the time they needed to de ne their choices. Each decision situation involved a number of tokens (de ning the individual incomes Y A t or Y B t ) and prices (p t ) for the food and beverage items they had selected before. Prices were expressed per 10 centiliters for the beverage item and per 10 grams for the food item. Participants could select their consumption quantities by using a scroll-bar, which implies a high degree of accuracy. ey had to spend the full budget, i.e. savings were not allowed. Appendix B presents the prices (p t ) and individual income levels (Y A t and Y B t ) for the 9 decision situations. 15 We note that the price-income situations in our experiment imply a high discriminatory power of our rationality tests (i.e. a high probability of detecting irrational behavior), because there is little variation in income but a lot of variation in prices. 16 Below, we will provide empirical measures for quantifying the power of our tests.
For the second part of the experiment, participants were matched randomly 2 by 2. For our sample, this obtained 7 female-female, 26 male-male and 25 male-female dyads. Each dyad again had to make 9 (in casu joint) consumption decisions. Similar to before, we did not specify a time limit. Each joint decision corresponded to an individual decision in the rst part of the experiment. Speci cally, if the individual decision was associated with incomes Y A t and Y B t and prices p t , then the dyad decision was characterized by a joint income Y t = Y A t +Y B t +10 and the same prices p t ; see again Appendix B. We gave the dyads a surplus of 10 extra tokens to provide them with an incentive to effectively nd an agreement. In every joint decision, participants had to consider the consumption quantities x A t and x B t , which they chose in the associated individual decision situations, as threat point bundles; these individual choices could no longer be changed and thus were to be conceived as exogenously xed. Joint decisions were made through face-to-face interaction. is possibility to communicate with each other implies that we can reasonably assume players have complete information about the context of the game (including each others' preferences), which is effectively required for the applicability of the Nash bargaining model as we described it above. In the case of a dyad decision, the subjects were asked to agree on a division of the joint income Y t over bundles q A t and q B t . In addition, for each consumption decision both participants had the possibility to default on the agreement (by clicking a radio button). is resulted in 48 dyads that always found an agreement. Below, we will only report results for these 48 dyads (and 96 individual 14 In particular, this assumes that the disagreement utility functions V A and V B coincide with the utility functions under individual decision making. We believe this to be a plausible assumption for our experimental setting.
15 e order of the decision problems was randomized over the participants. 16 For example, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003) apply a similar idea in their 'maximum power sequential path' procedure for maximizing the power of their revealed preference tests. players). 17 To enhance the external validity of our experiment, we told the participants beforehand that they would actually receive one of the consumption bundles they selected. e knowledge that each choice ostensibly had the same chance of being implemented was supposed to give economic signi cance to otherwise merely hypothetical decisions, thus providing participants with an incentive for making choices that truly represented their preferences. More speci cally, at the beginning of the second part of the experiment we explained that, if we picked a decision exercise from this second set of (joint) decisions, we would rst check whether each player preferred it to the default option. If this was effectively the case, then participants received the bargaining outcome q A t and q B t . In the other case, if at least one player preferred the disagreement option, then we gave the threat point bundles x A t and x B t . e goods were handed over in a separate room immediately aer the experiment, and they were given in packages that induced immediate consumption.
Two further remarks are to be made. e rst remark pertains to the fact that we only consider dyads who reached agreement in our empirical analysis. One may believe this creates a bias towards non-rejection of the Nash bargaining model, as it might be thought that choosing for disagreement automatically implies the Nash bargaining model does not apply. However, this last conclusion does not necessarily hold true. In particular, an alternative (and contrasting) explanation of disagreement behavior is that players do behave in accordance with the Nash bargaining model, but the individual utility structure is such that, for given prices and incomes, agreement does not enable a Pareto improvement over the threat point situation. 18 In this last case, it is indeed entirely rational to select the disagreement (i.e. threat point) outcome. Our methodology does not allow us to distinguish between this two alternative interpretations of disagreement behavior. erefore, we think it most natural not to consider dyads characterized by disagreement behavior to empirically assess the empirical validity of the Nash bargaining model. Implicitly, this accords an equal weight to the two contrasting interpretations mentioned above.
Our nal remark pertains to the fact our dyads have to make 9 sequential decisions. e reason is that, as explained above, our revealed preference conditions have testable implications only if we have multiple observations. In order to obtain a most pure test of Nash bargaining, we avoid homogeneity assumptions by collecting 9 decisions for each separate dyad. Implicitly, it assumes that individuals play each of the 9 bargaining games as if it were a single game. Given that participants were aware that they would only get one of the 9 chosen consumption bundles aer the experiment had nished, we believe this to be a reasonable assumption. Also, this practice follows the usual design of experiments that use revealed preference methodology for checking rationality assumptions; see, for example, Sippel (1997) , Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002) , who considered individual rationality, and Bruyneel, Cherchye, and De Rock (2012) , who focused on collective rationality. However, one may also argue that participants regard the experiment as representing a repeated bargaining game. In this interpretation, the bargaining outcome is actually a lottery de ned over the outcomes of 9 'partial' bargaining games, and there is no a priori reason why the outcome of these partial games must be Nash bargaining rationalizable. While we do recognize this possible 'rationalization' of what we will call 'violations' of Nash bargaining rationalizability, we do not see how to assess the empirical validity of this other explanation through a simple extension of the revealed preference framework set out in Section 17 In this respect, see also our remark below, where we motivate this exclusive focus on dyads reaching agreement. 18 Here, it is important to remark that the Nash bargaining solution accounts for possibly different individual utility functions under disagreement (for the threat points) and agreement (for the joint decisions); see the 'disagreement' functions V A and V B and the 'agreement' functions U A and U B in De nition 3. It is precisely because of these utility differences that agreement (joint decisions) needs not always yield a Pareto improvement over disagreement (threat point decisions), even though in our experiment the joint decision situations are characterized by higher joint income (while holding prices the same).
3. 19 erefore, we will persistently interpret our following results under the maintained assumption that players consider each decision situation as representing a different bargaining game. But it is worth to keep in mind that, indeed, this may imply reported 'violations' of Nash bargaining rationalizability that actually are consistent with the Nash bargaining solution under a repeated game interpretation (which, however, we cannot test).
Observed consumption behavior
Before entering our discussion of the testing results, we provide some descriptive information on the consumption behavior in our experiment. First of all, Table 2 presents summary statistics on the budget share of the beverage item; the budget share of the food item equals 1 minus this beverage budget share. We nd that the distribution of the budget shares is about the same for the individual decisions and the joint decisions. For example, the average share of the beverage item is close to 50% in the two conditions. Next, also the quartile values are always close to each other. In fact, we nd that there is quite some variation in the budget shares over different choice observations (minimum shares equal 0% and maximum shares equal 100%). Next, we consider the income shares of the individuals. In this respect, we rst recall from above that, if a dyad reaches agreement, it can spend an extra (joint) income of 10 tokens as compared to the disagreement (threat point) situation. Let us then describe how this surplus is divided over the two individuals. Speci cally, Table 3 reports on the distribution (de ned over all joint consumption decisions with agreement) of the lowest surplus share allocated to an individual in a joint decision situation. By construction, this lowest share cannot exceed 50%. A rst observation from Table 3 is that the lowest surplus share is negative in 45 decision situations (which is 10.7% of the decision situations): in these cases, the individual's bargained income is below the threat point income. 20 If we then consider the situations with positive surplus shares, the table reveals a bimodal pattern: a large number of joint decisions are characterized by (approximately) equal surplus sharing (i.e. lowest income share between 40% and 50%), but we also observe that many decisions allocate (almost) all the surplus to a single individual (i.e. lowest income share between 0% and 10%). In addition, there is a non-negligible amount of decisions 19 To take one important issue, evaluating the empirical validity of the repeated game interpretation necessarily involves auxiliary assumptions on how individuals aggregate outcomes over different partial games. For example, focusing on Nash bargaining in a 'pie sharing' context (as opposed to the consumption context that we consider here), Roth and Malouf (1979) assume that individuals are expected utility maximizers. Adopting a similar expected utility assumption here involves at least two complications. First, at the methodological level, it requires an extension of our revealed preference conditions that accounts for the empirical implications of expected utility maximization. Next, from an empirical point of view, it necessarily implies testing a double hypothesis, i.e. joint decision behavior is Nash bargaining rationalizable and players are expected utility maximizers. In other words, a rejection of the testable conditions may well reveal a rejection of expected utility maximization rather than a rejection of Nash bargaining behavior per se.
20 Importantly, such a negative surplus share does not automatically imply that behavior is not Nash bargaining rationalizable. For instance, our numerical Example 1 describes behavior that is Nash rationalizable, even though individual B is characterized by a negative surplus share in decision situation 1.
with the lowest income share between 10% and 40%. Taken together, these results suggest quite some heterogeneity in terms of surplus sharing across the different decision situations in our experiment. As a related exercise, we next investigate how individual threat point incomes relate to bargained incomes. In this respect, we recall from our discussion in Section 3.2 that, for the consumption setting under investigation, Nash bargaining rationalizability does not require this relation to be positive-monotonic. Still, we also indicated that a non-positive relationship may contrast with a priori intuition. erefore it seems interesting to investigate whether and to what extent we effectively do obtain a positive-monotonic association for the 48 dyads of our experiment (who reached agreement). To this end, we rst regressed individuals' bargained expenditure shares (i.e. individual income divided by total dyad income) on threat point income shares. In doing so, we accounted for dyad xed effects, which capture heterogeneity across different dyads. is obtained a slope coefficient of 0.315 (standard error 0.026) for the threat point income shares, which reveals a positive effect at any reasonable significance level. On average, a percentage point increase of the individual income yields an increase of the bargained income share of about 0.3 percent. us, at the sample level (and ignoring changing prices), the average relation between threat point and bargained incomes is indeed positive. As a complementary exercise, it is useful to check the same relation at the dyad level. In particular, for each different dyad we veri ed whether a higher threat point income share always corresponded to a higher bargained income share. We found that this (obviously stringent) positive-monotonicity requirement is ful lled for only 10 (out of 48) dyads, which gives a much weaker empirical case for positive-monotonicity than our earlier regression. It then seems interesting to relate these results to our ndings for Nash bargaining rationalizability (which will be discussed in more detail below). Here, we observe that 7 dyads meet the sufficient conditions for Nash bargaining rationalizability but not the positive-monotonicity condition. In fact, we also have another 6 dyads who do satisfy the positive-monotonicity condition but violate the necessary conditions for Nash bargaining rationalizability. is shows the empirical relevance of our earlier conclusion (following our discussion of Example 1): a positive-monotonic association between threat point incomes and bargained incomes is neither necessary nor sufficient for Nash bargaining rationalizability. As indicated before, the explanation speci cally pertains to our focus on consumption decisions. In such a setting, income levels are no longer the sole determinants of utility levels; (relative) prices of the consumption goods also become important utility drivers.
Test results
Before presenting our empirical results, we provide a brief explanation of the empirical performance measures that we will use to evaluate the behavioral models under study. ese performance measures are speci cally designed for a revealed preference analysis such as ours.
Empirical performance measures.
As indicated in the Introduction, revealed preference tests are not traditional statistical tests. e reason is that revealed preference conditions are essentially set predictors: for a speci c behavioral model, they predict that consumer choices will lie within a certain bounded region of the (consumption) outcome space. As an illustration, let us consider Figure 1 . e set Ω presents the outcome space for the setting at hand. For example, in our experiment this outcome space contains all sets of consumption bundles {q A t , q B t , x A t , x B t } t∈T that exhaust the available budgets. e revealed preference conditions associated with a certain behavioral model then effectively bound a region within this outcome space. In our example, we assume this region corresponds to the set A: a data set is consistent with the behavioral model under study only if the observed choices lie within A. 21 Now, assume that we observe a collection of data sets, and that each data set corresponds to a dot in Figure 1 . We nd that some dots lie within the set A, while other dots lie outside A. Of course, the higher the proportion of dots within A, the better the model is supported empirically. e pass rate quanti es this empirical support as the proportion of dots that are situated within the set A (which equals the proportion of data sets that satisfy the revealed preference conditions subject to testing).
However, pass rates only capture one dimension of empirical performance. In general, the pass rate of a model will be higher if the size of the set A becomes bigger. erefore, for a revealed preference test to be meaningful we want this set A to be sufficiently small. e smallness of the set A de nes the discriminatory power of the revealed preference test. More precisely, for the situation depicted in Figure 1 , we quantify this power as the relative size of the complement of A in the outcomes space Ω. is directly allows for an intuitive probabilistic interpretation: the power measure quanti es the probability that a data set generated by irrational behavior (i.e. behavior that is inconsistent with the evaluated model) effectively violates the relevant revealed preference conditions. Clearly, to quantify power we need a model of 'irrational' behavior. In our empirical application, we will follow the most common practice in the revealed preference literature, which de nes irrational behavior as corresponding to random draws from the outcome space Ω. is generates the power measure suggested by Bronars (1987) ; this author motivated this power measure as an operationalization of Becker (1962) 's theoretical notion of irrational behavior, which states that consumers randomly choose consumption bundles that exhaust the available budget. Despite its theoretical appeal, however, this method may also be conceived as a rather extreme one from a practical point of view: it does not impose any prior structure on the irrational behavior; basically, it assumes irrational consumers simply draw bundles from a uniform distribution de ned over the budget hyperplane. erefore, our empirical analysis will also consider a second power measure, which uses a bootstrap idea to model irrational behavior. is additional measure will enable us to check the robustness of our main empirical conclusions.
We conclude that the pass rate and the power of a given test form two parts of the same story. Generally, a favorable pass rate for a speci c behavioral model provides convincing support for the model only if the associated test has high discriminatory power. In practice, the two measures are almost always inversely correlated, which in fact makes it interesting to de ne a summarizing measure that com- bines these two dimensions of empirical performance into a single metric. Beatty and Crawford (2011) suggested such a measure which is based on an original idea of Selten (1991) . eir measure is called predictive success and is de ned as follows:
predictive success = pass rate − ( 1 − power )
Because pass rates and power values lie between 0 and 1, the value of this predictive success measure is always situated between −1 and 1. A value close to 1 indicates a model with approximately 100% power and 100% t, i.e. the best possible scenario. is means that (almost) all data pass the rationality test, even though the test effectively detects (almost) any deviating (i.e. irrational) behavior. By contrast, a value close to -1 implies a model with approximately 0% power and 0% t, i.e. the worst possible scenario. In this case, the test effectively allows for (almost) any observed (including irrational) behavior and yet the data fail to pass, which obviously suggests a highly dubious model. Finally, a value of 0 corresponds to a model with a rejection rate for the observed behavior (= 1 − pass rate ) that exactly equals the expected rejection rate if behavior were irrational (= power). Essentially, this means that the rationality test does not allow for distinguishing observed behavior from irrational behavior. Generally, if a model is associated with a predictive success rate below zero, then this seriously puts into question its empirical usefulness. erefore, for a model to be 'meaningful' we at least need that its predictive success rate is positive, and a higher value generally suggests a more useful model.
It is worth indicating that the predictive success measure de ned above actually assigns an equal weight to the power and pass rate. is equal weighting may seem arbitrary to some. However, Beatty and Crawford (2011) show that this weighting scheme has an interesting axiomatic characterization. 22 We believe this provides a convincing theoretical foundation for our focus on the (equally weighted) predictive success measure as it was originally presented by Beatty and Crawford.
So far, we have two put forward three empirical performance measures: pass rate, power and predictive success. We conclude by introducing a fourth measure that will be instrumental for our following analysis, namely goodness-of-t. e basic idea here is that some data set may not 'exactly' pass the revealed preference conditions (i.e. it lies outside the set A in Figure 1 ) but is very close to passing them (i.e. it is situated close to the boundary of A). Actually, from an economic perspective, exact optimiza-tion is oen not a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, we want to know whether the behavioral model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed behavior. erefore, we will also consider extended versions of the basic (sharp) tests that account for optimization error; these extended tests focus on nearly optimizing behavior rather than exactly optimizing behavior. See also Varian (1990) for a general discussion on the usefulness of considering such nearly optimizing behavior in empirical revealed preference analysis.
To assess the degree of nearly optimizing behavior, we look how pass rates, power rates and predictive success rates change if we relax our revealed preference conditions slightly. In terms of our example in Figure 1 , this corresponds to enlarging the set A to a slightly larger set, say A ′ . In our next empirical investigation, we will de ne weakened versions of the (exact) revealed preference conditions by using a goodness-of-t measure that takes values between 0 and 1. e measure adapts an early proposal of Afriat (1973) 
.
(e other rationalizability constraints have a straightforwardly similar construction.) If the Afriat index e = 1, then the extended tests coincide with the original sharp tests. Lower values for e account for optimization error and this generally implies weaker conditions to be tested, which makes the relative area of the consistent observations bigger. Considering e < 1 allows us to analyze the impact of optimization error on our pass rate, power and predictive success results. Let us explain the intuitive interpretation of the Afriat index in terms of the extended version of inequality (NB-i) stated above. (is interpretation carries over directly to the other rationalizability constraints.) Essentially, when comparing observation v (with quantities q A v ) to another observation t (with quantities q A t ), the Afriat index e reduces the expenditure level associated with observation v by a factor (1 − e) (i.e. we consider the expenditure level ep v q A v instead of the original level p v q A v ). In other words, we now check whether behavior is Nash bargaining rationalizable if allowing the individual A to waste as much as (1 − e) of the original income by making irrational choices. As such wasting/irrational behavior can be also be regarded as sub-optimizing behavior, we thus verify whether behavior is rationalizable if we account for an optimization error equal to (1 − e). Varying the value e allows us to consider alternative degrees of nearly optimizing behavior.
Pass rates.
We present results for the testable conditions in eorem 1 (individual rationality), eo-rem 2 (collective rationality) and eorems 4 and 5 (Nash bargaining rationality). A speci c focus will be on comparing the empirical performance of the Nash bargaining model with that of the collective model. Figure 2 presents the pass rates for the different tests under consideration: Individual Rationality (IR in what follows), Collective Rationality (CR) and Nash Bargaining Rationality (NBR). For each test, pass rates are measured as the fraction of participants or dyads that meet the associated rationalizability conditions. Figure 2 shows the pass rates as a function of the Afriat index e. We note that the gure contains 2 curves for Nash bargaining rationality: the lower curve corresponds to the sufficient conditions in eorem 4 and the upper curve to the necessary conditions in eorem 5. Table 4 provides exact pass rates for selected values of e.
Let us rst consider individual rationality. e IR curve in Figure 2 pertains to the 96 individuals (constituting 48 dyads) that found an agreement for all decisions (see the discussion of our experimental design). For each individual, we verify if the associated data set {p t , x M t } t∈T (M = A or B) satis es the conditions in eorem 1. Generally, we nd that individual rationality is well supported: pass rates are close to 1 even for high values of e. We conclude that individual rationality seems to be a reasonable assumption.
Next, the CR curve pertains to the 48 dyads that reached agreement. For each dyad, we checked if the data set {p t , q A t , q B t } t∈T meets the conditions in eorem 2. As explained above, this veri es whether Pareto efficiency is a tenable assumption for the joint decisions that we observe. e CR curve displays a similar pattern as the IR curve: pass rates are high, also when e gets close to 1. Similar to before, we can argue that collective rationality (or Pareto efficiency) appears to be a plausible assumption.
ese ndings for individual and collective rationality make it interesting to consider Nash bargaining rationality. In this case, our rationality tests apply the conditions in eorems 4 and 5 to the sets
As for the associated NBR curves in Figure 2 , we observe three remarkable facts. Firstly, the pass rates for the necessary and sufficient conditions are generally close to each other. is suggests that the empirical implications of the two conditions almost coincide. Also, when we decrease e, the pass rates for the two tests increase at a similar pace. In our opinion, this suggests that combining the two sets of conditions does form a useful basis for empirical analysis. is seems all the more true when taking into account that we considered a fairly basic grid search (with K = 9; see Section 3); a ner grid search can only bring the necessary and sufficient conditions closer to each other.
Secondly, we nd that pass rates are quite low if we consider the 'sharp' Nash bargaining rationality test: for an Afriat index e = 1, we get a pass rate between (only) 0.25 (sufficient conditions) and 0.27 (necessary conditions). However, pass rates increase very rapidly if we allow for some optimization error. For example, for e = 0.90 we obtain that no less than 92% of all dyads in our sample pass the Nash bargaining conditions (both necessary and sufficient). is suggests that the Nash bargaining model effectively does provide an adequate description of observed dyad behavior as soon as we account for nearly optimizing behavior instead of exactly optimizing behavior.
Our nal observation is directly related to the second one. If we exclude optimization error, then pass rates for the Nash bargaining test are substantially below those for the collective rationality test: for e = 1, the difference in pass rates is no less than 50 percentage points. However, and in line with our previous observation, this difference decreases rapidly with the Afriat index e. For example, if we consider e = 0.90, the difference is no more than 4 percentage points. us, when allowing for small optimization error, the pass rate of the Nash bargaining model (almost) coincides with the one of the collective model.
At this point, it is important to remark that lower pass rates for the Nash bargaining test can be expected a priori. Indeed, because the Nash bargaining solution imposes considerable structure on top of Pareto efficiency (see Section 3), pass rates for Nash bargaining rationality will always be situated below the pass rates for collective rationality. As such, the lower pass rates for the Nash bargaining model may also signal more discriminatory power rather than a worse model per se. is directly motivates our following exercises, which considers power and predictive success of the different models.
Power and predictive success. As explained above, to quantify power (and, correspondingly, predictive success) we need to model irrational behavior. Here, we follow Becker (1962) and de ne irrational behavior as randomly exhausting the available budget. (As a robustness check, we will also consider an alternative model of irrational behavior further on.) Because it is not possible to explicitly compute the power of our revealed preference conditions for the consumption setting under study, 23 we follow Beatty and Crawford (2011) by using numerical integration. In particular, we model irrational behavior by randomly drawing a quantity bundle from the budget hyperplane associated with each different price regime. We conducted Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 iterations, which obtained 1000 random data sets of 9 observations. Our power measure then equals the probability that our tests reject the revealed preference conditions for this simulated random/irrational behavior. Before presenting the predictive success rates of the different models, we have a quick look at the power results. For the four models under evaluation, Figure 3 sets out power as a function of the Afriat index e; Table 5 gives power estimates for a selection of values for e. Not surprisingly, we nd that power decreases with e for all models under evaluation.
Next, and more importantly, we observe a substantial difference between the NBR and CR curves. 24 In general, the discriminatory power of the Nash bargaining test is much above the one of the collective issues associated with power measures based on Becker's notion of irrational behavior. 24 In fact, the same applies when comparing the NBR and IR curves, but this difference is less relevant here.
rationality test, and the difference remains more or less constant for different values of e. In addition, we nd that the Nash bargaining test has no less than 100% power for e close to 1. In fact, power remains very high (i.e. close to 100%) for e = 0.90. Overall, this suggests that the Nash bargaining model is a very powerful one. Let us then consider the predictive success rates of the different models. Figure 4 displays predictive success rates as a function of the Afriat index e, and Table 6 gives predictive success rates for speci c values of e. ese results bring together our earlier pass rate and power results. Firstly, if we look at the IR and CR curves, we nd that predictive success generally increases with e. e best performing model speci cation corresponds to e = 0.99 (collective rationality) or 1 (individual rationality). In both cases, predictive success is about 0.60. Because this is far above zero, we conclude that both models can be categorized as 'good' (i.e. meaningful) models for the application at hand.
Next, it is interesting to compare the CR curve with the NBR curve. Here we nd that the Nash bargaining model with a little optimization error largely outperforms the collective model. For example, for e = 0.90 the predictive success of the Nash bargaining model amounts to no less than 0.90. is is very close to the maximum of 1, which indicates this speci cation of the Nash bargaining model as a 'very good' one for the setting under study.
At a more general level, we believe that these results provide a convincing empirical argument pro the Nash bargaining model. e model imposes considerable structure on joint decision processes, which gives it substantial discriminatory power. Interestingly, even though it implies much prior structure, the model does provide a good empirical t of the observed consumption behavior (if we account for a small amount of optimization error). In our opinion, these two attractive features together, which imply a high degree of predictive success, strongly suggest the model as a most valuable alternative for describing consumption decisions involving multiple players. As indicated above, our power (and predictive success) results are based on a speci c method to generate irrational behavior. e method operationalizes Becker (1962) 's theoretical notion of irrational behavior. However, as we also mentioned above, this notion of irrational behavior may be conceived as a rather extreme one: because it assumes that irrational consumers draw bundles from a uniform distribution de ned over the budget hyperplane, it basically does not impose any prior structure on the irrational behavior. To account for this critique, Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) propose an alternative method to measure discriminatory power, which is specially designed for panel consumption data, and which is also frequently used in revealed preference studies similar to ours. 25 Instead of using the uniform distribution, they suggest a bootstrap procedure for constructing random bundles, which draws from the empirical distribution to simulate random behavior. As a robustness check, we have also evaluated the different behavioral models under consideration on the basis of this bootstrap procedure. Speci cally, for each price-income regime we de ne consumption quantity bundles by randomly drawing budget shares (for the 2 goods) from the set of all observed consumption decisions under that price-income regime (i.e. 48 decisions under 9 different price-income regimes). We do this separately for the threat point decisions and the joint consumption decisions. is gives information on the expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating information on the participants' actual choices. Similar to before, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 iterations, which obtains 1000 random data sets with 9 observations. e associated power and predictive success results (for alternative values of the Afriat index) are reported in Appendix C, which contains the counterparts of Tables 5 and 6 . Generally, we nd that the bootstrap power rates are somewhat below the power rates in Table 5 . Like before, the Nash bargaining model is characterized by substantially higher discriminatory power than the collective model. Let us then regard the corresponding predictive success results. As expected on the basis of our power results, the predictive success rates in Appendix C are below those in Table 6 . Still, they are substantially above zero (for different Afriat index values), which leads to the same conclusion as before, i.e. the evaluated consumption models provide a good description of the consumption behavior under investigation. Next, and more importantly, we again nd that the Nash bargaining model with a little optimization error outperforms the collective model in terms of predictive success, albeit that the difference is less pronounced than before. Taken together, we believe these results provide further support for our earlier conclusion that the Nash bargaining model is supported well empirically.
What do we learn from all this?
We conclude from our analysis that the Nash bargaining model provides a good description of the observed consumption behavior in our experiment, especially if we account for a little optimization error. e model is characterized by revealed preference conditions that have substantial discriminatory power as compared to the other behavioral models that we evaluated. In this respect, it is especially interesting to compare our results for the Nash bargaining model with those for the collective model. Essentially, differences in empirical performance of these two models are directly induced by the additional structure imposed by the Nash bargaining model, on top of Pareto efficiency (which is the only assumption made in the collective model). In terms of the revealed preference characterization stated in eorem 3, this extra structure is speci cally captured by the constraints (NB-v) and, more importantly, (NB-vi). We recall from our discussion in Section 3 that constraint (NB-vi) pertains to the very nature of the Nash bargaining model, i.e. it directly follows from the requirement that a bargaining outcome must maximize the product of the individuals' excess utility. Our experiment leads us to conclude that this additional structure implies substantially more powerful empirical tests. Interestingly, the results of our predictive success measure also indicate that this additional power is not counterbalanced by a great loss in terms of pass rate (in particular if we account for nearly optimizing behavior instead of exactly optimizing behavior).
Nonetheless, from a practical point of view, a natural next question is whether the revealed preference approach can also be useful for analyzing observational (i.e. non-experimental) data. Aer all, consumption models are oen applied for analyzing household behavior on the basis of observational data. e use of observational data involves a number of speci c problems. First, it typically requires dealing with measurement problems and preference heterogeneity. We will brie y return to these issues in the concluding Section 6. Next, it can also involve a number of problems that speci cally relate to the de nition of the revealed preference conditions that are to be tested, which we discuss in the next section.
Extensions
When using observational household data, it may be the case that the Nash bargaining conditions derived in Section 3 are not directly applicable. For example, so far we have restricted attention to symmetric Nash bargaining. However, in real life (e.g. household) settings, it may oen be the case that players of the bargaining game are characterized by differing bargaining strength. In what follows, we will rst de ne revealed preference conditions for asymmetric Nash bargaining, which effectively accounts for such differences between individual bargaining strengths. Next, in practical applications, an important concern may be that observational data oen do not contain information on threat point bundles (x A t and x B t in eorem 3). For example, as thoroughly discussed by Chiappori (1988) , McElroy and Horney (1990) , McElroy (1990) and Chiappori (1990) , exact information on threat points is usually lacking in household consumption applications. erefore, in our following exposition we will also consider the possibility to account for unobserved threat points in revealed preference tests.
As a preliminary remark, we point out that a possible concern from a practical point of view may be that the revealed preference conditions introduced below have lower discriminatory power than our original conditions in eorem 3, because the underlying Nash bargaining models oen involve less prior structure for the consumption behavior. We will address this issue by using the experimental set-up of Section 4. Speci cally, we quantify discriminatory power of the newly developed conditions for Nash bargaining rationalizability by using the same procedure as for our results in Table 5 (thus following Bronars (1987) ), which will allow us to compare the power of the different conditions.
Asymmetric Nash bargaining
A popular extension of the standard Nash bargaining model is the asymmetric Nash bargaining model. Asymmetry here refers to the fact that different players have different bargaining power. More formally, let the parameter τ ∈ (0, 1) represent the bargaining weight of individual A, so that (1 − τ) gives the bargaining power of individual B. en, under asymmetric Nash bargaining the individuals A and B choose consumption bundles (q A t , q B t ∈ R |N| + ) that solve the following problem (OP-ANB):
In turn, this de nes the next rationalizability condition. 
Unobserved threat point bundles
Let us then consider Nash bargaining rationalizability when threat points are unobserved. For compactness, we will not explicitly discuss situations characterized by both asymmetric Nash bargaining and unobserved threat points. But it should be clear that our following results are fairly easily combined with the result in eorem 6 to deal with such instances.
As a starting observation, we note that the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model coincide with the ones of the collective model if threat point bundles are not observed (i.e. we have a data set S = {p t , q A t , q B t } t∈T ) and we make no further assumption. Speci cally, this case does not impose any restrictions on the consumption bundles at the threat points (i.e. x A t and x B t for all t ∈ T). As such, we can also freely choose the values of V A t and V B t . It is then easily veri ed that the corresponding testable implications of eorem 3 are equivalent to the ones of eorem 2. As a result, the Nash bargaining model is empirically indistinguishable from the collective consumption model. 26 Given this, our following analysis will make particular assumptions about the threat points. Specically, we will show that the Nash bargaining model obtains speci c restrictions if we assume either that the same threat points apply to different decision situations or that the individual incomes (rather than individual consumption bundles) at the disagreement points are known. As we will show, in each case the Nash bargaining model has stronger testable implications than the collective consumption model.
Our focus on these two speci c assumptions is motivated by our belief that they may be particularly relevant for analyzing observational data on household consumption. For example, in such a setting it may effectively be a reasonable hypothesis that threat points remain constant over a given period of time. Next, knowledge of the divorce legislation can help to simulate the income distribution in case of disagreement. We will return to possible applications on household data in the concluding Section 6. 
Constant threat points. Consider a data set S = {p
In what follows, we will use that the functions W A and W B are convex. We now get the following condition of Nash bargaining rationality.
we have used the same grid search for the power results in Table 8 . Generally, we may expect the lower and upper bounds to be situated closer to each other when using a ner grid search (with larger K). A most notable nding from Table 8 is that the lower bound power rates for the model under consideration are actually fairly close to (i.e. only slightly below) the power rates that apply to the symmetric and asymmetric Nash bargaining models studied before. In our opinion, this is an interesting observation to make, as it effectively suggests that the Nash bargaining model can be tested in a meaningful (i.e. powerful) way even if threat points are not observed (but assumed to be constant). As a direct implication, power rates in Table 8 are generally above the ones for the collective model (in Table 5 ). As a nal exercise, Table 9 presents the power results for the Nash bargaining model with (only) observed income at the threat points. Since the characterization in eorem 8 implies weaker data requirements than the characterization in eorem 3, it has a wider applicability. However, the counterpart is that its empirical implications generally have less discriminatory power. is is con rmed by the power analysis of our experimental data, where we replaced the threat point bundles by the corresponding individual incomes under disagreement (so that we can apply the conditions in eorem 8). When comparing the results in Tables 5 and 9 , we indeed observe that the conditions in eorem 8 are characterized by lower discriminatory power than our earlier Nash bargaining rationalizability conditions. And this difference becomes more pronounced for lower values of the Afriat index e. Nonetheless, from comparing Tables 5 and 9 , we can also deduce that the Nash bargaining model has (oen substantially) more discriminatory power than the collective model even if we only observe the individual threat point incomes. We believe this last nding convincingly motivates the practical usefulness of the rationalizability conditions in eorem 8. 
Conclusion
We have studied the testable implications of the Nash bargaining model for a two-player game involving consumption decisions on bundles of goods. e distinguishing feature of our study is that we followed a revealed preference approach. We have argued that this approach is particularly useful for verifying the empirical validity of the Nash bargaining model. We have derived a revealed preference characterization of the (symmetric and asymmetric) Nash bargaining model both when threat point bundles are observed and when threat point bundles are not observed. We have shown that this can be used for practical tests of consistency of observed behavior with the Nash bargaining model. We also demonstrated the usefulness of these tests by means of an application to experimental data. is provided a rst empirical test of the validity of the Nash bargaining model as a tool for describing consumption decisions. In addition, it showed that a specially tailored experiment can obtain a very powerful analysis of the Nash bargaining model as a tool for describing consumption decisions. Our analysis also allows us to draw some further theoretical and empirical conclusions. From a theoretical point of view, our results shed light on the different testable implications of the Nash bargaining model and the collective consumption model. In this respect, a rst observation is that the Nash bargaining model has stronger empirical implications than the collective model if we can observe the threat point bundles. ese additional implications re ect the fact that the Nash bargaining model imposes more prior structure on the consumption decisions than the collective model, which only maintains Pareto efficiency as an assumption. More interestingly, however, we have also demonstrated that the Nash bargaining model can have stronger implications even if the threat point bundles are not observed. Speci cally, we have shown that this is the case as soon as threat points are assumed to be constant over different decision situations or if individual incomes at the disagreement point are known by the empirical analyst. As discussed in Section 5, we believe that these last ndings may have practical usefulness for analyzing observational data (e.g. on household consumption) in terms of the Nash bargaining model.
At an empirical level, our application to experimental data has shown that the Nash bargaining model may effectively provide a good description of multi-player consumption decisions. In particular, we obtained that the testable implications of the model have much discriminatory power (e.g. when compared to collective consumption model). Importantly, even though it has considerable power, the model also provides a very good empirical t of the observed consumption decisions in our experiment. In our opinion, these two attractive features together strongly suggest the Nash bargaining model as a most valuable alternative for empirically analyzing joint consumption decisions.
We see different avenues for follow-up research. Firstly, given the favorable results for the Nash bargaining model in our experimental setting, we believe a natural next step consists of bringing the testable implications developed in this paper to household consumption data. Indeed, multi-player consumption models are oen used for the empirical analysis of household behavior. As indicated above, such an analysis can start from our revealed preference characterizations that allow for asymmetric Nash bargaining and/or unobserved threat point bundles. In this respect, one important remark pertains to the fact that all our testable conditions need that individual consumption bundles in bargaining outcomes are observed. is is oen problematic in a household context: household data sets usually only contain information on the aggregate household consumption and not on the individual consumption. Interestingly, however, data sets with individual consumption information are increasingly available in the literature. See, for example, Browning and Gortz (2006) , Bonke and Browning (2009), and Vermeulen (2012) . For such data sets our testable conditions are directly applicable, which may thus obtain a powerful revealed preference analysis of household consumption behavior.
Next, from an empirical point of view, household applications require dealing with observational (i.e. non-experimental) data, which oen involves data measurement problems and unobserved preference heterogeneity. In turn, this pleads for methodological extensions that enable statistical inference while accounting for these data features. Such methodological extensions may build further on recent work of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008) , Hoderlein and Stoye (2010) and Blundell, Kristensen, and Mazkin (2011) , who consider such issues for the revealed preference conditions associated with the unitary consumption model. We believe that extending their insights to our Nash bargaining setting may be particularly useful from a practical point of view, as it paves the way for convincing (i.e. meaningful) applications of our revealed preference methodology on the basis of observational data.
Finally, follow-up research can also focus on other bargaining solutions that are frequently consid-ered in the literature, such as the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the egalitarian solution and the equal sacri ce solution. Essentially, these models differ from each other in terms of the axioms they impose on the bargaining solution. In fact, by adopting a similar reasoning as in this paper, it is possible to derive the revealed preference characterizations of these alternative bargaining models. One can then use these characterizations to compare the empirical performance of the different models (and the underlying axioms). For example, such a comparison may carry out an experimental analysis similar to ours.
Proof of eorem 3
We will use the following lemma. 
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that (2) does not hold, i.e.
We can rewrite (1) to obtain the following equivalence statements:
Next, (3) implies
so that we obtain
By assumption the right hand side in this last inequality is positive, which yields the wanted contradiction. is proves the lemma.
We can now prove eorem 3.
Proof. Necessity. Take any t ∈ T. e rst order conditions of the optimization programs OP-NB and OP-TP are given by: is shows that the remaining constraints (NB-i)-(NB-iv) are also satis ed. Sufficiency. Similar to Varian (1982) Varian (1982) showed that the utility functions V A and V B make sure that, for all t ∈ T, x AFirst part of the experiment. e experimental designer illustrates his explanation with a presentation on the screen in front of the classroom. e rst part of the experiment has 9 exercises. Each exercise is structured the same way (see Figure  5 for an illustration). For each exercise, you are given an amount of virtual money, which we call tokens. ese tokens have to be divided between two goods: something to eat and something to drink (refer to the questionnaire where the speci c item was chosen). e amount of tokens varies from exercise to exercise. On the screen, you see two columns. e le column contains information about the beverage item and the right column contains information about the food item. e rst row of every column gives the price for the food item per 10 grams and the price of the beverage item per 10 cl. e prices vary over the different exercises. On the second row of each column you see the selected amount of each good and on the last row of each column you see the total expenditure on each good. Below the two columns, you see a scroll-bar. By moving this scroll-bar to the le or to the right you can allocate the budget over the two goods. If you place the bar all the way to the le, your total amount of tokens will be spent on the beverage. If you place the bar at the far right, the total amount of tokens will be spend on food. e aim of the exercise is to position the scroll bar so that you get the quantities that you would like to have. At the end of the experiment we will gather all of the exercises from this part of the experiment together with the exercises of the next part. en we will randomly choose one exercise and the quantities that you have chosen for this exercise will be given to you in the room below. Aer completing all the exercises, please wait in silence until everyone is nished. You may now begin. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
For all t ∈ T, let U
Second part of the experiment. At the beginning of the second part, all students with letter A were asked to sit next to the person with the same number and letter B. e explanation is illustrated by a presentation on the screen in front of the classroom. e second part of the experiment is similar to the rst part, but now you must solve the exercises together. Again, there are 9 exercises (see Figure 6 for an illustration). At the top of the screen, you nd the choices that you have made for an exercise that you solved in the rst part of the experiment. ese choices can no longer be changed. On the le, you see the choices for A and on the right you see the choices for B.
Both of you can now choose to cooperate or not to cooperate by clicking a radio button in the middle of the screen. is choice must be made individually. If one of you chooses not to cooperate then you have nothing to do for this exercise, and you can go to the next exercise. On the other hand, if you both choose to cooperate we pool both of your tokens and add an extra of ten tokens. en you need to divide this total amount of tokens over the two goods for each of you. e prices and division is given in the green boxes at the bottom of the screen. ese boxes are similar to the boxes in the rst part of the experiment. e information for A is on the le and the information for B is on the right. In the middle, you have some information concerning total expenditures. e division is done by sliding the three scroll-bars at the bottom of the screen. e rst scroll-bar splits the total budget between food and beverage. e middle scroll-bar divides the amount of beverage between you two and the bottom scroll-bar divides the amount of food between you two. By moving these scroll-bars you can choose any combination of goods you like the most. Please note that, while you choose individually whether you want to cooperate, you must decide together how to divide the total amount of tokens. Remember that at the end of the experiment we will gather all your exercises and give your choice for only one of them. If we happen to pick an exercise from the second part of the experiment, we will rst check whether both of you wanted to cooperate. If not, you both receive the quantities that you have chosen individually in the corresponding exercise from the rst part (i.e. the quantities at the top part of the screen). On the other hand, if you both have chosen to cooperate. you will receive the quantities of food and drinks that you chose together (i.e. at the bottom part of the screen). You may now begin. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
Prices and incomes
e following table presents the 9 price regimes and corresponding (individual and joint) income levels that we used in our experiment: Appendix C: bootstrap results e next two tables present, respectively, the bootstrap power rates and the corresponding predictive success rates for different values of optimization error: 
